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Abstract 7 
 8 
There is no dearth of academic research into the apparent benefits of mediation as a 9 
tool for the resolution of planning disputes. Several eminent lawyers have proffered 10 
their support for the use of this alternative dispute resolution mechanism within the UK 11 
planning system. Further, formalised mediation regimes have been introduced into the 12 
respective planning systems of a number of international jurisdictions, with apparent 13 
success; for example, in Australia, 34% of all planning disputes are now resolved via 14 
a form of mediation. Notwithstanding this apparent evidence-base, in England and 15 
Wales a substantial number of property developers, local authorities and planning 16 
professionals continue to believe that mediation is not useful or appropriate as a 17 
mechanism for resolving planning disputes and, despite early indications that a 18 
formalised mediation regime would be developed and adopted in England and Wales, 19 
to date no such regime has been implemented. This present research paper seeks to 20 
examine through black letter analysis and semi-structured interview why this apparent 21 
µPHGLDWLRQSDUDGR[¶FRQWLQXHV WRH[LVW and critically evaluates whether or not there 22 
GRHVLQGHHGH[LVWDµEXVLQHVV case¶ for the introduction of a formal mediation regime 23 
within the UK planning system.  24 
 25 
Introduction  26 
 27 
Globally, mediation has proven to be extremely successful in enabling disputing 28 
parties to engage in a constructive rather than destructive manner (Golberg, 2003).  29 
For example, in the context of construction disputes, which typically involve complex 30 
agreements and time-sensitive contracts, mediation enables a particular dispute to be 31 
solved quickly so that the contract itself does not become frustrated.  This is just one 32 
reason why construction and commercial contracts often feature a 33 
mediation/arbitration clause, so as to avoid lengthy and costly litigation.  It moreover 34 
provides for a cost-effective and swift method of solving disputes in a more informal 35 
manner than litigation.  Such benefits produce the expectation that mediation of 36 
planning disputes will result in quicker decisions, reduced time in determining 37 
applications, greater efficiency and an overall cheaper system.  However, it is 38 
important to recognise that mediation is not automatically more beneficial than 39 
litigation, and its role and advantages depends on the type of dispute involved.  It is 40 
also important to point out that mediation depends ultimately on the consent of the 41 
parties, and hence to impose it as a compulsory method of dispute resolution would 42 
undermine the very qualities and advantages that it claims to have over litigation.  The 43 
purpose of this paper is therefore to consider mediation in the context of planning 44 
disputes in the UK, with a view to determining its potential role, opportunities and 45 
challenges.  This will be applied to determine the viability of mediation for planning 46 
disputes in the UK, and whether a framework can be developed and structured to 47 
ensure that maximum benefit is gained from using mediation for such disputes.   48 
 49 
 50 
Research Context 51 
 52 
As has been briefly addressed above, mediation provides a more cost-effective, faster 53 
and generally more beneficial form of dispute resolution than litigation for certain types 54 
of disputes.  It is for these reasons that mediation may be considered a potentially 55 
useful form of dispute resolution in the field of planning disputes in the UK.  Mediation 56 
for such disputes promises to facilitate participation in planning disputes on a much 57 
broader level, thereby promoting inclusiveness, and allowing for a broader and thus 58 
more accurate range of interests to be taken into account.  The flexible nature of 59 
mediation also enables the process to be tailored according to the particular features 60 
of the individual case (Bacow and Wheeler, 2013).  It is within this context that the 61 
potential benefits of mediation planning disputes should be approached and 62 
considered, in order to determine whether such benefits are applicable to this type of 63 
dispute.  64 
 65 
The potential for mediation in the field of planning disputes has certainly not gone 66 
unnoticed in the UK.  In 1996, a public debate was commenced by Chief Planning 67 
Inspector Chris Shepley concerning the potential benefits that mediation could offer 68 
and planning disputes (Shepley, 2013). It also addresses certain important features 69 
and qualities of mediation that would need to be maintained and protected in order for 70 
the benefits of mediation to become realised.  This is an important issue, because it 71 
addresses the fact that the success or failure of mediation for planning disputes 72 
depends largely on how the mediation process is structured for such disputes.  73 
Shepley for example emphasises the need to maintain certain core standards in 74 
mediation for planning disputes, such as its voluntariness and confidentiality.  He also 75 
VWUHVVHVWKDWPHGLDWLRQVKRXOG³QRWDIIHFWWKHULJKWVRIDSSOLFDQWVWRJRRQWRDSSHDO76 
in the normal way; or the rights of local authorities to make democratic 77 
GHFLVLRQV´(Shepley, 2013; pg 49)  Academic attention has also been given to such 78 
issues, with prominent focus on the successes of mediation for planning disputes in 79 
other jurisdictions, such as the US (Stubbs, 1997).  Such interest did not however 80 
provoke any major reforms in the UK; it merely resulted in the publication of policy 81 
guidance and recognition of the potential benefits of mediation for such disputes 82 
(DCLG, 2006). Given the recognised advantages of mediation in the field of planning 83 
disputes, it is quite surprising that no major practical changes have been implemented 84 
in the UK.  This forms the main context of the research, in that it recognises and acts 85 
upon the need to progress from theory to practice, and to develop an effective 86 
mediation framework for planning disputes.  It is moreover important to draw 87 
experience from other jurisdictions in which mediation is used for such disputes.   88 
 89 
The most prominent is Scotland, although other jurisdictions such as Australia and the 90 
US will also prove helpful.  Identification of the advantages and challenges of such a 91 
system will provide useful guidance on whether, and if so, how, a mediation framework 92 
for planning disputes could be structured and implemented in the UK. It is difficult to 93 
doubt or undermine the benefits that mediation has the potential to offer planning disputes.  It 94 
has for example been recognised that it could reduce appeals, in that problems could be eased 95 
at an early stage rather than resorting to an expensive and time-consuming appeal process 96 
(Barker, 2007).  97 
 98 
 99 
 100 
 101 
The UK government has however taken relatively few tentative steps towards promoting 102 
mediation for planning disputes.  It has, for example, merely expressed that LW³VXSSRUW>V@WKH103 
YROXQWDU\XVHRIPHGLDWLRQZLWKLQWKHSODQQLQJV\VWHP´DQGUHFRJQLVHGWKHQHHGWR³ZRUNZLWK104 
UHOHYDQW SURIHVVLRQDO ERGLHV WR SURPRWH PHGLDWLRQ VHUYLFHV E\ ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV´(HM 105 
Government, 2007). It appears that policies and plans have lost pace when they reach the 106 
implementation stage, giving rise to the need to determine how a mediation framework for 107 
planning disputes may be best implemented, and what such a framework would need to 108 
contain.  Planning disputes do not typically involve disputes concerning rights; they rather 109 
feature a disagreement between a local authority and a landowner about what they consider 110 
to be appropriate (Watson, 2016).  This becomes all the more complicated due to the fact that 111 
third parties are able to participate in and contribute to the debate.  Planning disputes may 112 
therefore often be more accurately defined as debates.  This further supports the claim that 113 
mediation is better suited to such disputes/debates because it provides an arena for voicing 114 
opinions and arriving at a negotiated outcome (Kaufmann et al, 2014). It is therefore clear that 115 
there is convincing evidence to suggest that mediation may play an important and valuable 116 
role in solving planning disputes.  It is further necessary to ensure that the mediation process 117 
is tailored to suit the particular features of land disputes, so that potential problems and 118 
challenges may be avoided or minimised.  Examples from other countries in which a structured 119 
mediation regime for planning disputes has been implemented will provide guidance in this 120 
respect. 121 
 122 
This research is of considerable importance for a number of reasons. First, if mediation 123 
is indeed a cost-effective tool for the expedient resolution of planning disputes, then 124 
the adoption of a formalised mediation regime the UK could accelerate investment into 125 
the respective property sectors of England and Wales. After all planning disputes delay 126 
developments and, consequently, a dispute resolution mechanism which can facilitate 127 
an earlier settlement of such disputes will ensure a faster realization of the benefits of 128 
development projects, including but not limited to higher levels of taxation revenue, 129 
employment, and housing stock (IRS, 1971). A study commissioned by the UK 130 
Government in 2002 estimated that the adoption of a formal mediation regime within 131 
WKH8.¶VSODQQLQJVHFWRUZRXOGUHVXOWLQWKHUHDOL]DWLRQRIELOOLRQRILQYHVWPHQWLQWR132 
the UK economy 40 weeks earlier than would be the case if all planning disputes were 133 
resolved via formal litigation. The findings of this study suggest that there is indeed a 134 
strong evidence-base in support of the adoption of a formal mediation regime within 135 
WKH8.¶VSODQQLQJV\VWHP 136 
 137 
Second, planning appeals in the UK cost the Exchequer around £25 million each year 138 
(Planning Inspectorate, 2010), and substantially more still for the developers and local 139 
authorities embroiled in these formal proceedings (Ratcliffe et al, 2009). If mediation 140 
is a cost-effective and viable alternative to formal litigation, then its widespread 141 
adoption would almost certainly result in a reduction in the number of appeals being 142 
lodged each year and a substantial cost saving for all parties involved and the 143 
Exchequer (Ratcliffe et al, 2009).  144 
 145 
Third, there is evidence that the UK government is seeking to promote the 146 
development of a less centralised and more community-oriented planning system 147 
(Pemberton et al, 2015); for example, the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 148 
2004 and the Planning Act 2008, both emphasise²and give a statutory footing to²149 
the importance of efficient pre-application procedures and community participation. 150 
While mediation is only required after a dispute has arisen, as opposed to at the pre-151 
application stage, nevertheless there is a clear synergy between the objectives of 152 
mediation and this emerging public policy agenda.  153 
Ultimately, the overriding objectives of this agenda are to increase stakeholder 154 
participation and to reduce the number of formal planning appeals being lodged with 155 
the courts. If mediation can help the parties to resolve their disputes without recourse 156 
to the formal appeals process, then at least the latter of these two agenda will be 157 
promoted, albeit at the post-application stage. Whether or not mediation is 158 
simultaneously capable of enhancing stakeholder participation is something that will 159 
be discussed at length within the body of this paper. Traditionally, mediation was 160 
developed as an informal and private mechanism for the confidential resolution of 161 
bilateral or bipartisan disputes; however, it will be argued in this paper that mediation 162 
is a highly flexible process and this form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has 163 
no intrinsic qualities or characteristics that would preclude it from being modified to 164 
accommodate a wider number of community participants. So long as the expectations 165 
of the parties are managed appropriately, and a suitable form of mediation is adopted, 166 
this ADR mechanism can be an excellent way of allowing a wider range of 167 
stakeholders to participate in the negotiation process than would ordinarily be entitled 168 
to participate in the judicial appeal process (MacLaren et al 2007).  169 
 170 
Research Issues, Aims and Objectives 171 
The first research issue relates to the potential benefits that mediation provides in 172 
planning disputes, both in its own right, and in comparison to litigation.  This will 173 
provide a basis for developing specific conclusions and reasoned arguments 174 
pertaining to the benefits of mediation for planning disputes.  This then gives rise to 175 
the research issue pertaining to the potential disadvantages of mediation for planning 176 
disputes.  This is an important issue, because it recognises that mediation is not 177 
automatically advantageous for all mediation disputes.  The objective of this research 178 
area is to balance the potential advantages and disadvantages of mediation for 179 
planning disputes.  This will provide a formula for determining how a mediation 180 
framework may best emphasise the advantages and eliminate the disadvantages of 181 
mediation for planning disputes, by reference to, for example, mediator training and 182 
confidentiality.  Example in this context will be drawn from planning mediation regimes 183 
in other countries, in order to determine their strengths and weaknesses, and how a 184 
similar, improved framework may be established and implemented in the UK.  Other 185 
jurisdictions in which mediation is used to resolve planning disputes will be examined, 186 
in order to determine how they are applied, and their failures and successes.   187 
 188 
The research paper seeks to (i) evaluate the viability of mediation as a mechanism for 189 
the resolution of planning disputes which occur between developers and public 190 
authorities, (ii) identify the barriers to the uptake of mediation within the planning 191 
system of England and Wales; and, (iii) derive recommendations for legal and political 192 
UHIRUPWREULQJ(QJODQG¶VSODQQLQJV\VWHPLQOLQHZLWKVRPHRILWVPRUHSURJUHVVLYH193 
counter-parts, such as Australia and Scotland. 194 
 195 
Research questions 196 
 197 
These aforementioned research issues, aims and objectives may be outlined as 198 
encompassing the following research questions: 199 
 200 
(i) Is mediation more cost-effective than formal litigation and ADR in resolving 201 
planning disputes? How can this cost-effectiveness be measured? What is the 202 
µPHGLDWLRQSDUDGR[¶DQGLVLWDSDUDGR[DIWHUDOO" 203 
(ii) What issues routinely characterise planning disputes and how might mediation 204 
better be suited to the resolution of these kinds of dispute over formal litigation 205 
and other forms of ADR? 206 
(iii) Is mediation an appropriate mechanism for the resolution of disputes between 207 
private developers and public authorities? 208 
(iv) What lessons may be learned from the respective mediation regimes for 209 
planning disputes in Scotland and Australia and how might these regimes 210 
inform planning law and policy in England and Wales?  211 
(v) Is there a compelling business case for the introduction of a formal mediation 212 
regime within the UKs planning sector? In any event, what recommendations 213 
for reform can be proffered as a result of this findings of this present study? 214 
 215 
Methodology 216 
 217 
The primary methodology of this research takes the form of black-letter analysis.  218 
 219 
For each research question identified above, a set of core database search terms were 220 
derived, which were used to locate relevant textbooks, sections in edited textbooks, 221 
journal articles, case reports, legislation, government consultation papers and 222 
newspaper articles. Relevant facts, figures and arguments were then extracted from 223 
these sources and categorised broadly into (i) data highlighting actual (empirical) or 224 
potential (theoretical / academic) benefits of mediation in planning; (ii) data revealing 225 
actual or potential challenges and barriers to the adoption of mediation in planning; 226 
and, (iii) data providing insights into the legal and political reforms required to exploit 227 
those advantages and/or overcome those barriers.  228 
 229 
In addition, a semi-structured interview was conducted with a Planning Director at the 230 
London branch of NathanLDO/LWFKILHOGDQG3DUWQHUV WKH8.¶VSUH-eminent planning 231 
and development consultancy. The purpose of this interview was to glean an expert 232 
SUDFWLWLRQHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHYDULRXVEDUULHUVWRWKHLQFUHDVHGXSWDNHRIPHGLDWLRQ233 
by developers and local authorities in England and Wales. It was hoped that this 234 
primary research would reveal certain cultural or practical barriers to the uptake of 235 
mediation in this context which are not so readily identifiable from black-letter analysis 236 
of the academic literature alone. In addition, because developers usually act on the 237 
DGYLFHRI WKHLUSODQQLQJFRQVXOWDQWV WKH LQWHUYLHZHH¶VRZQRSLQLRQRQ WKHPHULWVRU238 
otherwise of mediation within planning is directly relevant.  239 
 240 
The semi-structured interview methodology was selected to ensure that the interview 241 
process was sufficiently flexible to allow this researcher to explore any novel issues 242 
which were raised by the interviewee during the interview (Crichton et al, 2013). This 243 
was particularly helpful as the interviewee raised a number of interesting issues and 244 
perspectives which this present author had not identified from the black-letter analysis 245 
undertaken during the preliminary stages of this research project. 246 
 247 
 248 
While the reliability of the data obtained from this interview is tempered by the fact that 249 
the sample population comprised only one individual, this was more than mitigated by 250 
the expertise and seniority of the interviewee, whose team is directly responsible for 251 
the strategic management of a property portfolio valued in excess of £1 billion. If a 252 
Planning Director at Nathaniel Litchfield and Partners holds a particular viewpoint on 253 
the merits of mediation, that viewpoint is highly likely to be representative of the 254 
professional opinions of a substantial number of consultants and professionals within 255 
KHU LQGXVWU\ $Q ³H[SHUW LQWHUYLHZ´ ZLWK D VPDOO QXPEHU RI VHQLRU SURIHVVLRQDOV LV256 
preferable, in terms of data quality, than a greater number of semi-structured 257 
interviews with persons with less relevant professional expertise (IAC-MEBM, 2016).     258 
 259 
The results from the semi-structured interview will not be analysed individually; 260 
instead, this author will cite relevant excerpts from the transcript of the interview to 261 
support arguments made throughout this paper.  262 
 263 
 264 
Definitional and methodological uncertainty; defining and evaluating the cost-265 
effectiveness of mediation, as opposed to formal litigation or other forms of 266 
ADR.  267 
 268 
In this section, this author examines the difficulties in defining a working definition for 269 
the WHUPµPHGLDWLRQ¶DQGH[SODLQVWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKLVGHILQLWLRQDODQGFRQFHSWXDO270 
uncertainty for reliable international comparative analysis and also for evaluating the 271 
cost-effectiveness of mediation, as compared to formal litigation or, indeed to other 272 
forms of ADR. It is concluded that the primary rationale for this present study is not as 273 
convincing as it appeared during the preliminary research phase of this project. 274 
 275 
7KHSUREOHPRIGHULYLQJDZRUNLQJGHILQLWLRQIRUWKHWHUPµPHGLDWLRQ¶ 276 
 277 
It is no straightforward task to derive a working definition for the term mediation 278 
(Morassso, 2011). The term and the process of mediation are used in so many 279 
different contexts (Nicholson, 2009)²legal and non-legal²that it is difficult to derive 280 
one singular definition which encompasses all essential characteristics of this process 281 
(Barsky, 2009). Definitions which do attempt to achieve generality are invariably too 282 
simplistic to be useful to an academic researcher. For example, Schrumpf et al define 283 
mediation DV³«DFRPPXQLFDWLRQSURFHVVLQZKLFKWKHSHRSOHZLWKWKHSUREOHPZRUN284 
together, with the assistance of a neutral third party, cooperating to resolve their 285 
conflict peaceably (Schrumpf et al, 1997)´ This definition provides no real insight into 286 
the nature of the mediation process, the role of the mediator²beyond the fact that 287 
mediators DUH µQHXWUDO¶²or the nature of the outcome of the process. It is also not 288 
entirely clear that this definition is capable of distinguishing mediation from other types 289 
of ADR, such as conciliation [1] 290 
 291 
 292 
 293 
 294 
.   295 
 296 
 297 
Those definitions which are sufficiently specific to serve as a working definition for the 298 
term mediation, tend to be limited to a specific context or to a particular variant of 299 
mediation RUWRRQHRUPRUHDXWKRU¶VSHUVRQDOFRQFHSWLRQVRIWKHSURFHVVRUDYDULDQW300 
thereof, and are therefore also of limited use. For example, even though it is generally 301 
agreed that there exist five main types of mediation²facilitative, evaluative, 302 
transformative, therapeutic and narrative mediation (Brooker,2013)² there is no 303 
general consensus as to the meaning of these terms and different authors tend to 304 
adopt their own prescriptive or descriptive definitions for this nomenclature. Bush and 305 
Folger, for example, GHILQHµWUDQVIRUPDWLYHPHGLDWLRQ¶WKURXJKUHIHUHQFHWRDSURFHVV306 
of human development which involves a transformation in the behaviour of the actors 307 
involved in the mediation process (Spencer and Brogan, 2007); whereas, Boulle and 308 
Nesic have an entirely GLIIHUHQWFRQFHSWLRQRIµWUDQVIRUPDWLYHPHGLDWLRQ¶DQGXVHWKH309 
WHUPV µWUDQVIRUPDWLYH PHGLDWLRQ¶ DQG µWKHUDSHXWLF PHGLDWLRQ¶ LQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ 310 
(Brooker, 2013: pg 8).  311 
 312 
In the introduction to this paper, this author stated that there is wide support in the 313 
academic literature for the adoption of a formal mediation regime within tKH 8.¶V314 
planning system. One would have thought, by now²bearing in mind that this debate 315 
originates from the mid-1990s²that a single ZRUNLQJGHILQLWLRQIRUWKHWHUPµPHGLDWLRQ¶ 316 
or at least for the preferred type of types of mediation would have emerged from the 317 
planning literature. Unhelpfully, this is not the case; in fact, it is not uncommon for 318 
academic articles dedicated to the promotion of this agenda to avoid altogether any 319 
attempt to define this term or to specify which type of mediation they are advocating. 320 
This could help to explain why, to date, this recurrent agenda has failed to be 321 
implemented in the UK; if there is no broad agreement on the form that the mediation 322 
process comprising this formal regime should take then how can the authorities be 323 
expected to know which type of mediation process and (accompanying) procedure to 324 
prescribe?  325 
 326 
The lack of definitional certainty in this area is perhaps itself a result of the informal 327 
nature of mediation and the wide degree of autonomy which is given to mediators to 328 
decide how to bring the disputing parties towards consensus (Brooker, 2013; pg 1). 329 
$V &KHUQ DUJXHV ³There are as many different types of mediation as there are 330 
mediators (Chern, 2014)´ In the UK, the focus of mediation training is on the 331 
µIDFLOLWDWLYH¶ DQG µHYDOXDWLYH¶ YDULHWLHV (Chern, 2013); however, in practice, the 332 
professional experience and instinct of the mediator is more likely to guide the 333 
mediation process than his or her formal training. This view is supported empirically; 334 
various studies have found that one of the more reliable predictors of the success of 335 
mediation is the skill and experience of the mediator (Roberts, 2014). In practice, this 336 
means that there must be a high level of inconsistency in the success rates between 337 
different mediators (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2009). This inconsistency may help to 338 
explain why there seems to be such wide disparity between the success rates of 339 
mediation within different nation states. For example, in Canada and New Zealand, 340 
the success rates of mandatory mediation are 80% and 73% respectively; whereas, in 341 
England and France, the published success rate for mandatory mediation is 50% or 342 
lower (Hopt and Steffek, 2013). A wide variety of different forms of mediation are being 343 
practiced internationally, within entirely different legal and cultural environments, by 344 
mediators with different types and level of training and experience, and consequently 345 
there is a wide disparity between the success rates of mediation within different nation 346 
states. 347 
 348 
The implications of this uncertainty for this present study and the difficulty in 349 
measuring the cost-effectiveness of mediation, as compared to formal litigation 350 
and other forms of ADR:  'HEXQNLQJWKHµPHGLDWLRQSDUDGR[¶ 351 
 352 
The implications of this uncertainty and inconsistency for this present study are 353 
SRWHQWLDOO\SURIRXQG,QRUGHUWREXLOGD µEXVLQHVVFDVH¶IRUWKHDGRSWLRQRIDIRUPDO354 
PHGLDWLRQUHJLPHLQWKH8.¶VSODQQLQJV\VWHP it is necessary to present compelling 355 
evidence that mediation is likely to be more cost-effective at resolving planning 356 
disputes than either formal litigation or other forms of ADR. Intuitively, it seems that 357 
the best source from which to derive this evidence is empirical data from other 358 
jurisdictions which have already adopted such a regime, successfully. However, in 359 
practice, due to the disparity identified supra, it is now clear that this methodology is 360 
flawed; simply stated, there are too many different factors which affect the success 361 
rate of mediation to defend the assertion that a particular mediation regime would be 362 
effective in the UK, on the basis that it has proven to be effective in another jurisdiction.  363 
 364 
This does not mean that lessons cannot be learned from other jurisdictions which have 365 
implemented a formal mediation regime successfully; however, it does mean that 366 
recommendations for reform cannot be based solely upon international experience. It 367 
also means that one has to be very careful to examine the processes and procedures 368 
which are being employed by these successful regimes, avoiding wherever possible 369 
WKHXVHRISRSXODUQRPHQFODWXUHVXFKDVµPHGLDWLRQ¶DQGµIDFLOLWDWLYHPHGLDWLRQ¶ZKLFK370 
denotes a degree of generality which, simply stated, does not exist. As Poon writes, 371 
³there are so many different styles and approaches [to mediation] that labels cannot 372 
capture them accurately (Poon, 2010).´Failure to heed this warning could result in the 373 
well-intentioned, but totally meaningless, cRPSDULVRQ RI µDSSOHV¶ DQG µRUDQJHV¶ RU374 
ZRUVHDSURSRVDOWRDGRSWµDSSOHV¶WRGRWKHMRERIµRUDQJHV¶EHFDXVHµIUXLW¶KDVSURYHQ375 
to be effective in a foreign jurisdiction. Ardent proponents of mediation attempt to 376 
overcome these challenges by asserting that mediation is more cost-effective than 377 
litigation, even if the success rate of mediation is inconsistent. Mediation is so 378 
inexpensive as compared to formal litigation, they argue, that even if success rates 379 
are low, the additional expenses incurred as a result of failed mediation are 380 
insignificant compared to the cost-savings which result from a successful mediation 381 
and the avoidance of court litigation (MacNaughton and Martin, 2002).  382 
 383 
To these commentators, the lack of uptake of voluntary mediation therefore represents 384 
DµSDUDGR[¶RIVRUWVWKHVHDXWKRUVFDQQRWFRPSUHKHQGZK\DUDWLRQDODFWRUZRXOGQRW385 
choose to participate in mediation when its cost-benefits are so obvious (Cortez, 386 
2016). To these authors, the lack of uptake of this form of ADR can therefore only be 387 
explained through reference to factors other than cost-effectiveness.  388 
 389 
In the opinion of this present author, and for reasons which will be explained below, 390 
WKHµPHGLDWLRQSDUDGR[¶LVQRWDSDUDGR[DWDOO,QIDFWWKHUHDUHOHJLWLPDWHDQGUDWLRQDO391 
reasons for disputants to choose to forego voluntary mediation and proceed directly 392 
to formal litigation.  393 
 394 
 395 
 396 
For one thing, the cost-effectiveness argument fails to take into account the other 397 
µFRVWV¶RIDIDLOHGPHGiation, such as the delay in resolving the dispute (Agapiou and 398 
Ilter, 2016) and the fact that the parties to a failed mediation may have inadvertently 399 
compromised their legal positions by revealing their respective legal strategies to their 400 
opponents during the mediation process (Clark, 2007). It also fails to take into account 401 
the fact that disputes which are resolved by mediation may have been resolved in any 402 
event, through negotiation, prior to trial (Clark, 2012). Further, the parties to a 403 
mediation may decide to appoint legal professionals to represent their interests, and 404 
consequently, mediation may prove to be just as costly as formal litigation, especially 405 
since these extra-judicial legal costs cannot usually be recovered in most jurisdictions 406 
(Susskind et al, 2000).  Furthermore, the cost-effectiveness of mediation needs to be 407 
evaluated within the context of the specific legal system in which it is taking place; 408 
legal rules governing mediation can affect substantially the relative cost-effectiveness 409 
of this process (Alexander, 2008).  410 
 411 
In any event, there is no reliable empirical methodology available to test the veracity 412 
of this pro-mediation argument. Not only would the findings of such a study lack 413 
external validity due to the inconsistencies discussed previously in this section, unless 414 
the sampling was sufficiently broad and data extracted from a sufficiently wide cross-415 
section of different types of µmediation¶ from the same jurisdiction, but hypothetical 416 
assumptions would also need to be made about the likely costs of resolving by court 417 
litigation disputes which have been resolved successfully through mediation. This 418 
would be required in order to prove that the cost-savings enjoyed by the parties to 419 
successful mediations exceed the additional costs expended by the parties whose 420 
mediations were not successful. Unsurprisingly, the few noteworthy attempts that have 421 
been made to empirically test the cost-effectiveness of mediation (as comparted to 422 
litigation) (Bondy and Mulcahy, 2009) have been as inconsistent as the definition of 423 
µPHGLDWLRQ¶DQGWKHSXEOLVKHGVXFFHVVUDWHVRIWKLVIRUPRI$'5 424 
 425 
$V %ULDQ &ODUN ZULWHV ³While hyperbolic, anecdotal claims as to the cheapness of 426 
mediation abound, the empirical evidence on the issue of cost-effectiveness is more 427 
mixed. Discernable cost benefits for parties may vary wildly of course depending on 428 
context (Clark, 2012)´,QIDFWWKHUHLVDERG\RIHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWLQJWKHYLHZ429 
that mediation may not be a cost-effective dispute resolution mechanism at all, 430 
especially if the mediation process is court-connected or mandatory (Agapiou and Ilter, 431 
2016). While these studies are also methodologically flawed, they nevertheless 432 
demonstrate conclusively that the cost-effectiveness of mediation cannot be taken at 433 
face-value, however intuitive the arguments of its proponents may appear to be.  434 
 435 
Revisiting the rationale for this present study and the conclusions of this 436 
section.  437 
 438 
In the introduction of this paper, this author cited the findings of a study commissioned 439 
by the UK Government in 2002 which estimated that the adoption of a formal mediation 440 
UHJLPHZLWKLQWKH8.¶VSODQQLQJVHFWRUZRXOGUHVXOWLQWKHUHDOL]DWLRQRIELOOLRQRI441 
investment into the UK economy 40 weeks earlier than would be the case if all planning 442 
disputes were resolved via formal litigation.  443 
 444 
 445 
In light of the preceding analysis it seems quite clear that the findings of this 446 
government-funded study must be treated with a high level of scepticism; bearing in 447 
mind the uncertainties and inconsistencies identified in this section, especially those 448 
pertaining to the challenges of relying upon international comparative analysis in this 449 
context, there is simply no methodology available which could produce reliable results 450 
with this level of quantitative specificity. 451 
 452 
The focus of the preceding analysis was limited to a comparison between the cost-453 
effectiveness of mediation and court litigation. However, logically, the same 454 
conclusions and concerns derived above are equally applicable to a comparison 455 
between the cost-effectiveness of mediation and other forms of ADR.   456 
 457 
In conclusion, it must be argued that presently there does not exist an adequate 458 
evidence-base from which to justify the implementation of a formalised mediation 459 
UHJLPH ZLWKLQ WKH 8.¶V SODQQLQJ V\VWHP RQ JURXQGV RI FRVW-effectiveness alone. 460 
Consequently, in order to justify the introduction of such a regime, it is necessary to 461 
take a step backwards, and look specifically at the nature of planning disputes to see 462 
if there exist other measurable barriers to efficiency, in this context, which might be 463 
overcome, measurably, through the adoption of a formalised mediation regime. For 464 
example: In the introduction to this paper it was argued that the UK government is 465 
committed to improving community participation in the planning system; if mediation 466 
could improve stakeholder participation in an appropriate way, then this could be a 467 
legitimate ground in its own right for introducing a formal mediation system within the 468 
UK planning system.  469 
 470 
 471 
 472 
 473 
  474 
 475 
 476 
 477 
 478 
 479 
 480 
  481 
Mediation, within the context of planning disputes: What issues routinely 482 
characterise planning disputes? 483 
 484 
7KH WHUP µSODQQLQJ¶ HQFRPSDVVHV D ZLGH VSHFWUXP RI GLIIHUHQW DFWLYLWLHV DQG485 
FRQVHTXHQWO\WKHWHUPµSODQQLQJGLVSXWH¶GHPDQGVGHILQLWLRQ)RUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKLV486 
present paper, the term is used narrowly to refer to those disputes which arise between 487 
GHYHORSHUV DQG ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV SULRU WR GXULQJ RU DIWHU WKH JUDQW RI µSODQQLQJ488 
SHUPLVVLRQ¶LHSHUPLVVLRQWRGHYHORSRUFRPPHUFLDOise real estate in a certain way.  489 
 490 
Because of the intrinsic value of real estate, the outcome of a planning dispute can 491 
have substantial economic impacts on the parties. A successful application for 492 
SODQQLQJSHUPLVVLRQFDQDGGFRQVLGHUDEOHYDOXHWRDGHYHORSHU¶VODQG&RQYHUVHO\DQ493 
unsuccessful application can reduce considerably the value of that land, by confirming 494 
that the land in question does not enjoy short- or medium- term development 495 
prospects. A successful planning application can also have profound positive and/or 496 
negative impacts upon the community at large, depending upon the nature of the 497 
proposed development and its likely impact on the aesthetics, economy, infrastructure 498 
and citizenship of the affected locality. Therefore, planning disputes are rarely frivolous 499 
or vexatious, and they are invariably contentious, as they navigate those difficult 500 
waters which exist at the interface of private rights and public interests (Levy, 2016): 501 
 502 
Private developers understandably wish to maximise the land value of their real estate 503 
holdings, and are therefore likely to pursue aggressive and ambitious development 504 
strategies (Barlow and Duncan, 2004). Local authorities welcome planning 505 
applications for such schemes, as privately-funded property development can bring 506 
considerable benefits to the local area, including new housing stock, infrastructure, 507 
local amenities and aesthetic enhancement. However, all large-scale developments 508 
will have both positive and negative impacts upon the local community, and local 509 
authorities must consider each planning application carefully on its own merits, to 510 
ensure that the overall impact of any approved scheme is likely to be positive (Crook 511 
et al, 2016). This utilitarian approach to planning decision-making enjoys a statutory 512 
footing. For example, section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as 513 
amended) adopts a mechanism through which developers may offer local authorities 514 
incentives to offset the potential negative impacts of their proposed development 515 
schemes (Jansen et al, 2008), for example, by providing a sum of money for local 516 
authorities to invest in public amenities (Cullingworth et al, 2014).  517 
 518 
Planning disputes may arise for a number of different reasons. However, in practice, 519 
the vast majority of planning disputes arise where a developer believes that a local 520 
authority has failed to discharge its duties or powers properly or in a timely manner 521 
and commences formal litigation against the local authority to appeal that decision or 522 
compel a determination (Isaac et al, 2016). The substance of such a dispute usually 523 
hinges around the correct interpretation and contextual application of a particular law 524 
RU SROLF\ $V 3DXOLQH5REHUWV RI 1DWKDQLHO /LWFKILHOGDQG 3DUWQHUV H[SODLQV ³It all 525 
comes down to planning law and compliance with the statutory development plan. 526 
PropoVDOVHLWKHUFRPSO\ZLWKWKHVWDWXWRU\GHYHORSPHQWSODQRUWKH\GRQ¶W5HFRXUVH527 
LVWKHDSSHDOSURFHGXUHRUMXGLFLDOUHYLHZLIDQXQODZIXOSURFHVVKDVWDNHQSODFH´ 528 
 529 
 530 
Consequently, planning disputes are atypical²as compared to traditional claimant-531 
defendant litigation²because they arise when developers and planners have different 532 
views of what is appropriate, rather than as a result of the alleged infringement of a 533 
right, per se. This viewpoint is supported by Sir Henry Brooke who explains the nature 534 
of planning disputes, succinctly:  535 
 536 
A typical planning dispute does not involve a dispute between parties about a right. It is an 537 
argument between a landowner and a local authority about what is appropriate... It is wrong to 538 
assume that an applicant for planning permission, or an appellant who challenges a refusal of 539 
planning permission, can be equated with a claimant in civil litigation, with the local authority in 540 
the role of a defendant [Brooke, 2015]. 541 
 542 
These kinds of dispute do lend themselves to settlement by mediation, as they are 543 
interest-based rather than positional (Berger, 2006)DVQRWHGSUHYLRXVO\DGHYHORSHU¶V544 
interest is in maximizing the value of their land asset and local authorities are (or ought 545 
to be) interested solely in protecting the public interest. This means that there is wide 546 
scope for the parties to move from their opening gambits to reach a consensus, so 547 
long as the local authority is able to reconcile a compromise with the public interest.  548 
 549 
In England and Wales there are three different ZD\VWKDWDQDSSHDOFDQEHµKHDUG¶E\550 
written representations, by hearing or by public inquiry (Isaac et al, 2016). While there 551 
is no right, under English law, for third-parties to appeal an initial planning decision 552 
(Norton, 2017), once an appeal has been lodged by a developer, interested third 553 
parties, such as neighbouring local authorities, commercial rivals, neighbours, 554 
statutory bodies or local groups, are entitled to participate in the appeal process, 555 
should they so wish, by submitting written representations and giving oral testimony 556 
at any hearings or inquiries (Harwood, 2013). The entitlement of third parties to 557 
participate proactively in the appeal process is an added complication of English 558 
planning law (Brooke, 2015), and it follows that if the judicial appeal process is going 559 
to be replaced with a formalised first-instance mediation regime, then that regime will 560 
need to accommodate at least the same level of third-party participation as is 561 
accommodated by the judicial process.  562 
 563 
This presents both a challenge and a potential opportunity for the pro-mediation 564 
agenda; the challenge is to ensure that the rights of third parties to be represented 565 
within the planning appeal process are not compromised by the introduction of a formal 566 
mediation regime; the potential opportunity is to devise an alternative dispute 567 
resolution process which actually enhances third party participation. Whether or not 568 
this challenge and opportunity can be overcome and realised, respectively, forms the 569 
subject-matter of the following section of this paper.  570 
 571 
It has been argued in the academic literature that mediation may also be a viable 572 
alternative to judicial enforcement action, i.e. where local authorities bring proceedings 573 
against land owners who have failed to comply with the conditions and limitations of 574 
their planning permission (Pugh-Smith, 2011). This type of planning dispute does not 575 
usually involve third parties, even though enforcement proceedings are often 576 
instigated as a result of third party referrals.  577 
 578 
 579 
 580 
In the opinion of this present author, there are some immediate and obvious concerns 581 
with the utilization of mediation as a first-instance enforcement mechanism; 582 
QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHGHILQLWLRQDOXQFHUWDLQW\VXUURXQGLQJWKHZRUGµPHGLDWLRQ¶DQGWKH583 
huge variety of different processes which are subsumed by the umbrella of this term, 584 
it is unlikely that the threat of enforcement action would have the same deterrent effect 585 
if mediation replaced litigation as the dispute resolution mechanism of first instance. 586 
In fact, the adoption of a formal mediation regime for the resolution of such disputes 587 
could lead developers to believe that the conditions and limitations attached to 588 
planning permission grants are somehow negotiable post facto. Unfortunately, there 589 
is no empirical data available to test this thesis or to quantify the potential reduction in 590 
compliance with planning conditions which might result from the adoption of a formal 591 
mediation regime for planning enforcement action. There is, however, in the context 592 
of the criminal justice system, evidence that mediation has less of a deterrent effect 593 
than more formal enforcement mechanisms (Roberts, 2002); it seems likely, to this 594 
author, that a similar effect would be observed within the context of the UK planning 595 
system. 596 
 597 
Legal precedent is also valuable in this arena, and the adoption of a formalised 598 
mediation regime could curb the development of planning law (Costello, 1996). As 599 
noted previously, the substance of a planning dispute usually hinges around the 600 
correct interpretation of a particular law or policy; if such disputes are routinely 601 
mediated then future litigants may not be able to enjoy the precedential value of the 602 
outcome of that dispute (Arnavas, 2014). While the adoption of a formalised mediation 603 
regime might²and the evidence is by no means compelling²cause a reduction in 604 
litigation costs for disputing parties, it would almost certainly cause more disputes to 605 
arise in the first place, as mediation outcomes are usually bespoke, confidential, 606 
idiosyncratic, party-controlled and not legally binding on anyone except for the 607 
signatories to the mediated settlement agreement (Hopt and Steffek, 2013). This 608 
unintended consequence of the adoption of such a regime could, ultimately, be more 609 
costly than the problem which the regime seeks to overcome.  610 
 611 
In addition, if the majority of planning disputes were settled through traditional 612 
mediation, which would presumably be the objective of a formalised mediation regime, 613 
then local and regional disparity in planning decisions would be exacerbated, because 614 
the settlement of those disputes would be controlled by the local authorities involved 615 
and not by an independent tribunal applying national laws, policies and principles. This 616 
ZRXOG EH DW RGGV ZLWK WKH 8. JRYHUQPHQW¶V IRcus on addressing these kinds of 617 
disparity in the application of planning law (Thomson and Maginn, 2012).   618 
 619 
+RZ PLJKW µPHGLDWLRQ¶ satisfy or exceed the minimum requirements for 620 
community participation? 621 
 622 
It has been argued in the academic literature that mediation can be an highly effective 623 
mechanism for the resolution for disputes which occur at public-private interface 624 
(Alexander, 2006). Various models have been proposed to combine conflict resolution 625 
and public participation through mediation and such schemes have been shown to be 626 
highly successful at empowering local communities and building trust between 627 
community interest groups, private parties and local government (Spencer and 628 
Brogan, 2006).   629 
 630 
 631 
However, these scheme are invariably complex, and their success depends upon the 632 
quality of the preparatory work undertaken by the mediator and his or her skill in 633 
managing what is tantamount to a multi-party (facilitated) negotiation (Sanoff, 2000). 634 
As Leibmann argues, in a multi-party mediation involving various interest groups it is 635 
important for the mediator to meet with each group individually to discern the main 636 
issues which they wish to be addressed or resolved during the mediation process 637 
(Liebmann, 1998); this is painstaking and meticulous work and would take 638 
considerable time to manage at a considerable cost. In larger disputes involving a 639 
substantial number of parties it may even be necessary to appoint more than one 640 
mediator in order to preserve the neutrality of the process and ensure that all the 641 
parties interests are adequately addressed (Cooley and Lubet, 2003). 642 
 643 
It is no straightforward task to evaluate the likely cost of such a process and it is by no 644 
means clear that mediation lends itself naturally to community or third-party 645 
participation; in fact, as has been argued above, the management of the mediation 646 
process can be very complex when there are more than two parties involved (Cooley 647 
and Lubet, 2003). Various questions would need to be resolved in order to devise a 648 
formalised mediation regime capable of replacing the existing appeals process. For 649 
example, would third parties be allowed to participate actively in the mediation 650 
process, or would they simply be allowed to make representations in the hope that 651 
these representations would influence the negotiating positions of the parties? If the 652 
former was the case, then would the mediation fail if consensus could not be reached 653 
between all the parties to the mediation? This would be giving third parties far more 654 
control over the outcome of planning disputes than the current appeals system and 655 
would likely reduce considerably the success rate of the mediation regime, as a 656 
successful outcome would be contingent upon a consensus being reached between a 657 
larger number of parties. On the other hand, if the latter was the case, then there would 658 
be no guarantee that third-party representations would be taken into account by the 659 
disputants, at all, as in a traditional mediation the parties to the dispute retain control 660 
over the substance of the settlement agreement (Hardy and Rundle, 2010).  661 
 662 
There does exist at least one case study of mediation being used successfully as a 663 
consultation mechanism for stakeholders involved in planning proposals for a 664 
brownfield site (Williams, 2010). However, this was not a planning dispute, per se, and 665 
therefore is of limited value as a procedural precedent for the management of multi-666 
party mediations. As Craig Howell Williams QC concedes, the inclusion of multiple 667 
third parties in the mediation process may not only present practical problems but may 668 
represent a fundamental obstacle to the use of this form of ADR in the planning context 669 
(Williams, 2010). 670 
 671 
+RZPLJKWµPHGLDWLRQ¶RYHUFRPHWKHSUHFHGHQWLVVXHLGHQWLILHGsupra?  672 
 673 
One potential solution here would be to vet all disputes, prior to mediation, to ensure 674 
that they are not likely to have important precedential value on a point of law. A similar 675 
evaluation process is used in Canada, where judicial mediation is routinely utilised to 676 
resolve both civil and criminal disputes (Alexander, 2006). However, this would add 677 
another layer of procedural complexity to the process and add further costs, which 678 
would need to be quantified before giving any serious consideration to its adoption.  679 
 680 
In addition, it has been argued that a significant number of planning disputes do 681 
LQYROYHSRLQWVRIODZDQGWKHUHIRUHWKLVµVROXWLRQ¶PLJKWDFWXDOO\SUHYHQWDODUJHQXPEHU682 
of planning disputes from being mediated, undermining UDLVRQG¶HWUH for a formalised 683 
mediation regime within the UK planning system.   684 
 685 
Another potential solution would be to choose a different alternative dispute resolution 686 
procedure entirely, such as arbitration, which is capable of producing awards with 687 
precedential value (Rovine, 2013), even though arbitral awards are not per se binding 688 
on third parties (Smeureanu , 2011). In the following section of this paper, this author 689 
will discuss a form of mediation which has been adopted in Italy, under which the 690 
mediator²a highly trained legal professional²is entitled to hand down an award of 691 
his or her own device, if the parties are unable to reach consensus. It is possible that 692 
awards produced by this mediation-arbitration hybrid process would be capable of 693 
having precedential value, so long as the mediator also ensured that the parties were 694 
not free to reach a private consensus on a valuable point of law. In other words, the 695 
evaluation process described in the previous paragraph of this section would be 696 
undertaken by the mediator, who would arbitrate points of law while allowing other 697 
aspects of the dispute to be mediated, if possible (Telford, 2000).  698 
 699 
In any event, the discussion of such a proposal falls outside the strict scope of this 700 
present research study, and it is not clear whether or not the adoption of such a 701 
scheme would ameliorate concerns about the exacerbation of regional disparities in 702 
decision-making by local planning authorities.  703 
 704 
In conclusion to this section, while a substantial number of planning disputes are likely 705 
of a kind which lend themselves naturally to resolution by mediation, it is not at all clear 706 
how the present rights of third parties which are enshrined within the existing English 707 
planning system²namely, to be represented in the planning appeals process²would 708 
be replicated or enhanced by the use of mediation. In addition, legitimate concerns 709 
have been raised by this author that the use of mediation in this context could 710 
exacerbate the regional disparity in public decision-making which the UK government 711 
seems so keen to address. Further, an increase in the number of planning disputes 712 
being resolved through mediation could stifle the development of English planning law, 713 
by restricting the flow of judicial precedent. While it might be possible to overcome this 714 
challenge by introducing a pre-mediation dispute evaluation or screening procedure, 715 
to decide which disputes ought to be resolved by a judge and which ought to be 716 
mediated, ultimately this would add to the infrastructure costs of the UK planning 717 
system and would probably mean only a small number of disputes end up being 718 
mediated (as planning disputes often involve disagreements on the appropriate 719 
application of law and policy). 720 
 721 
Finally, it is not at all clear that mediation would be a viable alternative to judicial 722 
enforcement in this context, as the adoption of a formalised mediation regime for these 723 
kinds of µdispute¶ could undermine the deterrent effect of the conditions annexed to 724 
planning permission grants. Further research would be required in order to test this 725 
thesis, but empirical data pertaining to the effect of introducing mandatory mediation 726 
into other parts of the UK legal system indicates that this may well be the case.  727 
 728 
 729 
 730 
  731 
Can the public interest be mediated? Is mediation an appropriate mechanism 732 
for the resolution of disputes between private developers and public 733 
authorities? 734 
 735 
In this section, this author critically evaluates the appropriateness of mediation as a 736 
formal alternative to the existing judicial appeal and judicial review processes, bearing 737 
in mind the public interest in the outcome of planning disputes.  738 
 739 
It has been argued in the academic literature that mediation is not always an 740 
appropriate tool for the resolution of planning disputes between local authorities and 741 
developers, because its success, as a process, depends upon both parties reaching 742 
a compromise solution and the public interest ought to be non-negotiable (Brooke, 743 
2015). In other words, local authorities are constitutionally bound to determine and 744 
protect the public interest (Harlow et al, 2003) and it is not appropriate for local 745 
authorities to compromise on that position in order to accommodate the private 746 
interests of property developers. 747 
 748 
It is important, here, to compare the process of mediation with the process of formal 749 
litigation and ask the question, what makes mediation less appropriate than formal 750 
litigation as a guardian of the public interest? The most obvious answer is that a judge 751 
is competent and duty-bound to protect the public interest whereas a mediator or the 752 
parties to a mediation are not. The role of the courts is not to resolve disputes but to 753 
give PHDQLQJDQGRSHUDWLRQDOFRQWHQW WR WKHYDOXHVRIVRFLHW\ WRJHWKHU µWKHSXEOLF754 
LQWHUHVW¶,QFRQWUDVWWKHUROHRIDPHGLDWRULVWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHVHWWOHPHQWRIDVSHFLILF755 
dispute between two or more parties. Concerns have been raised in the academic 756 
literature as to whether the public interest can be appropriately safeguarded if public-757 
private disputes are diverted towards non-legal channels, such as mediation, which 758 
are not subject to the same procedural safeguards as formal litigation (Roberts, 2013). 759 
 760 
While this argument enjoys intuitive appeal, it is predicated upon the assumption that 761 
planning authorities always make the right decisions, ab initio, which of course is not 762 
WKHFDVH$SODQQLQJGHFLVLRQZLOOEHLQIRUPHGE\DQDXWKRULW\¶VRZQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ of 763 
applicable local, regional and national laws and policies and when private parties 764 
believe that these laws and policies have been misinterpreted or misapplied then a 765 
dispute may arise. For such disputes, the mediation process could actually help the 766 
parties to better understand the arguments of their counter-parts and result in a 767 
compromise solution which better serves the public interest than the respective initial 768 
positions of the disputing parties. There is a strong public interest in reversing 769 
inappropriate decisions of public authorities as quickly as possible; as argued 770 
SUHYLRXVO\GHOD\HGGLVSXWHUHVROXWLRQVORZVGRZQWKHUDWHRILQYHVWPHQWLQWRWKH8.¶V771 
property sector and increases the administrative and legal costs of the parties involved 772 
and the Exchequer. Consequently, mediation could, in theory, serve an important 773 
function in protecting the public purse, by providing an informal and (arguably) 774 
inexpensive preliminary appeal or review process.  775 
 776 
(YHQZKHQDORFDODXWKRULW\¶VLQLWLDOSODQQLQJGHFLVLRQdid represent the public interest 777 
at the moment in time when that decision was reached, the public interest is not a 778 
static animal; the process of mediation might bring new information and options to light 779 
which could justify a re-HYDOXDWLRQRIWKHORFDODXWKRULW\¶VLQLWLDOSRVLWLRQ 780 
)RUH[DPSOHDORFDODXWKRULW\PLJKWGHFLGHWRUHMHFWDSODQQLQJDSSOLFDWLRQRQµJUHHQ781 
EHOW¶ODQGWRSUHVHUYHDQGSURWHFWLWVRSHQVSDFHVDQGWRFRQWUROXUEDQVSUDZO:KLle 782 
it would certainly be inappropriate for that local authority to compromise on its position, 783 
solely to accommodate the private interests of a developer, a compromise solution 784 
may involve that developer offering to provide additional investment into social 785 
KRXVLQJ IRUH[DPSOHZKLFKFRXOGRXWZHLJK WKHDXWKRULW\¶V LQLWLDOREMHFWLRQV WR WKDW786 
development. While, historically, this kind of public-private negotiation was viewed as 787 
a form of bribery, since the enactment of section 106 of the Town and Country 788 
Planning Act 1990, it is now commonplace for developers to offer local authorities 789 
financial incentives to approve applications which might otherwise be deemed contrary 790 
to the public interest and there is now a statutory framework governing the procedure 791 
for this kind of negotiation.  792 
 793 
In light of the existence of section 106, which specifically encourages negotiation 794 
between developers and local authorities, it is difficult to find a principled objection to 795 
the idea of a mediation-led settlement process, even where that settlement results in 796 
the reversal of an otherwise appropriate and lawful planning decision; the settlement 797 
agreement may better serve the public interest than the initial decision, as it may result 798 
in a greater public benefit than the benefit which would have resulted had the initial 799 
position or decision of a local authority been upheld. However, in reality, it is difficult 800 
to see what role mediation could play in this scenario when there already exists a 801 
statutory framework governing section 106 negotiations and those negotiations are so 802 
similar to the mediation process, albeit without an independent third party sitting 803 
between the disputants. This is a point that was raised by Pauline Roberts of Nathanial 804 
Litchfield and Partners during the semi-structured interview conducted as part of this 805 
research study. When asked whether mediation might be a useful next-step, if a 806 
section 106 negotiation does get stuck, as opposed to proceeding directly with a formal 807 
appeal, Mrs Roberts replied in the negaWLYH³,IVHFWLRQQHJRWLDWLRQVGREHFRPH808 
stuck, then the correct approach is to lodge an appeal within the strict time limits or 809 
you will risk not getting a decision at all. The negotiations are usually led by 810 
experienced consultants²and are usually successful²and so, if section 106 811 
negotiations become stuck there is a strong chance that mediation would also fail to 812 
produce a compromise solution. For that reason, it is preferable to lodge a formal 813 
appeal on grounds of non-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ´ 814 
 815 
Based upon these expert insights, it seems clear that if mediation is going to play an 816 
effective role in expediting section 106 negotiations, the mediation process would need 817 
to be of a type capable of replacing the function of the appeal process, rather than the 818 
function of the section 106 negotiation process. After all, if the mediation process 819 
simply usurped the function of the section 106 negotiation, then it would be largely 820 
redundant; it is not in the interests of either developers or local authorities to protract 821 
their negotiations and it is difficult to see how the presence of a third party mediator 822 
could, by itself, render mediation more effective than negotiation, especially when the 823 
parties to these kinds of disputes are experts in their field. 824 
 825 
Additionally, guarantees would also need to be offered to ensure that participation in 826 
WKHPHGLDWLRQSURFHVVGLGQRWSUHMXGLFHWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶ULJKWWRDSSHDORQJURXQGVRI827 
non-determination, should the mediation fail, a concern which is clearly implicit in Mrs 828 
Robert response, supra. 829 
 830 
This thesis seems to be supported by Martin Burns, the head of the RICS Dispute 831 
Resolution Services team, who argues that mediation could play a useful role in 832 
ensuring that local authorities engage in a timely manner with the section 106 process, 833 
for example by making mediation compulsory where a section 106 negotiation has 834 
failed to produce a definitive outcome:  835 
 836 
ADR can be an effective mechanism to help speed up the planning process and, in particular, 837 
S106 negotiations. But perhaps it should be that, only in circumstances where S106 838 
negotiations do not result in S106 agreements, and developers and local authorities manifestly 839 
fail to comply with new statutory timescales, should the prospect of decisions being taken out 840 
of the control of local authorities actually become reality (Burns, 2016). 841 
 842 
While Martin Burns does not overtly advocate the adoption of a special form of 843 
mediation here, he does indicate that once the negotiations have proceeded to 844 
PHGLDWLRQWKHXOWLPDWHGHFLVLRQZRXOGEHµWDNHQRXWRIWKHFRQWURORIORFDO DXWKRULWLHV¶845 
As discussed in section 1 of this paper, mediation does not usually involve decisions 846 
being taken out of the hands of the parties, as WKHPHGLDWRU¶V UROH LV IDFLOLWDWLYHDV847 
RSSRVHGWREHLQJGHWHUPLQDWLYH7KHRQO\ZD\WRPDNHVHQVHRI%XUQ¶VFRPPHQWVLV848 
to assume that he is referring to a mediation process which can result in a mediator 849 
reaching a binding decision, in the event that the parties are unable to negotiate a 850 
mutually agreeable compromise solution. In other words, it seems that Martin Burns is 851 
advocating for the adoption of some form of mediation-arbitration hybrid to sit between 852 
the section 106 negotiation and formal appeal processes.  853 
 854 
When asked to comment upon the viability of such a process, during the semi-855 
structured interview, Mrs Pauline Roberts replied:  856 
 857 
If a local authority failed to reach a section 106 decision in a timely manner, and there existed 858 
a compulsory and binding form of mediation where the mediator could assume the role of an 859 
arbitrator if the mediation failed to produce a satisfactory section 106 agreement, then this could 860 
indeed be more attractive to a developer than a formal appeal. However, its value would 861 
probably be limited to larger schemes only, as section 106 negotiations on small or simple 862 
schemes tend not to get stuck [2]. 863 
 864 
This response suggests that there may indeed be some merit in introducing an 865 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism between section 106 negotiations and the 866 
existing appeals process; however, it is clear that traditional mediation is not the right 867 
tool for the job and that a hybrid of mediation and arbitration may be more appropriate.  868 
 869 
It is worth a quick mention that a mediation-DUELWUDWLRQRUµPHG-DUE¶ regime has recently 870 
been introduced in Italy. Under this regime, if the parties are unable to reach an 871 
agreement, or if one of the parties does not attend the mediation, then the mediator is 872 
entitled to propose legal solutions and the parties to the mediation are bound to accept 873 
WKHPHGLDWRU¶VILQDOSURSRVDOV8SXQWLOthe final decision has been handed down, the 874 
parties remain free to negotiate not only with their counter-parts but also with the 875 
mediator, so they do retain a high degree of control over the process and also the 876 
outcome.  877 
 878 
 879 
 880 
 881 
This scheme has been criticised heaving within the academic literature for a number 882 
of reasons. First, it has been argued that this process is at odds with the very definition 883 
of mediation and compromises the neutrality of the mediator. While this present author 884 
agrees that this form of mediation is atypical, as was argued at length in section 1 of 885 
this paper, there is no such thing as a standardised mediation process and 886 
consequently it is difficult to see why this argument be should be given much weight.  887 
 888 
Second, it has been argued that this kind of process would require a degree of skill 889 
and experience beyond that which can be expected from a normal mediator. As Hanks 890 
DUJXHV ³In any case, it indicates a particular need to ensure that mediators are 891 
adequately trained and have the requisite knowledge to propose solutions that are 892 
legally HQIRUFHDEOHDQGLQWKHSDUWLHV¶ interests. Thus, the changes implemented by 893 
Italy will only be effective if they are complemented by the education of legal 894 
professionals and the training of a large number of mediators to handle the inevitable 895 
increase in claims (Hanks, 2012).´ 896 
 897 
In the opinion of this present author, mediators should be adequately trained with the 898 
requisite knowledge of the subject-matter of the disputes they preside over irrespective 899 
of the kind of mediation which they are undertaking. This is supported by the empirical 900 
evidence cited in section 1 of this paper, which proves that there is a positive 901 
correlation between the skill of a mediator and the prospect for successful resolution 902 
of a dispute. In the context of planning disputes, which are in any event highly 903 
specialised, it is particularly important that the mediator is sufficiently knowledgeable 904 
in the intricacies of planning law. Consequently, it is difficult to see how this is a 905 
legitimate objection to the adoption of this kind of med-arb mediation.  906 
 907 
+DQNV¶concluding remark WKDWWKHVXFFHVVRI,WDO\¶VQHZUHJLPHZLOOGHSHQGXSRQWKH908 
training of a large number of mediators to handle the inevitable increase in claims is 909 
somewhat misplaced; this seems to be an objection to the mandatory nature of the 910 
process and not to the role of the mediator per se. If a mandatory mediation regime is 911 
going to be introduced, it follows that the relevant authorities will need to ensure that 912 
there is adequate infrastructure in place to accommodate the increased case load; 913 
however, if the regime failed because of a lack of infrastructure it would not be 914 
appropriate to conclude that the regime failed because of the role of the mediator or 915 
the nature of the mediation process being employed.   916 
 917 
Further research would be required in order to test the viability of introducing such a 918 
scheme in England and Wales. It will be very interesting to see how the Italian regime 919 
works in practice although, for the reasons articulated in section 1, one has to be 920 
careful not to assume that a system which works well (or badly) in one jurisdiction 921 
would perform equally well in another.  922 
 923 
In conclusion, this present author rejects the public interest objections to the 924 
introduction of a formalised mediation regime for the resolution of disputes flowing 925 
from failed section 106 negotiations. However, this author is not convinced that 926 
mediation could serve a useful function here; it is very similar in nature to negotiation 927 
and it is difficult to see why mediation would succeed where negotiation has failed, 928 
especially in this context where the disputing parties are highly professional, 929 
impersonal and are interest-oriented as opposed to being positional.  930 
In any event, it seems that section 106 negotiations are usually successful so there is 931 
no real problem here for mediation to solve. If a formalised mediation regime is going 932 
to be adopted to sit between section 106 negotiations and the appeals process, it 933 
ought to replace the functions of the latter and not the former. In the opinion of this 934 
present author, for the reasons set out in this section, mediation, in its traditional non-935 
determinative form, is the wrong tool for the job.    936 
 937 
  938 
What lessons may be learned from the respective mediation regimes for 939 
planning disputes in Scotland and Australia and how might these regimes 940 
inform planning law and policy in England and Wales?  941 
 942 
In this short section, this author examines the different µmediation¶ regimes which have 943 
been introduced into the planning systems of New South Wales and Scotland. The 944 
experiences of New South Wales reinforce the idea that mediation in its traditional 945 
form is not likely to be a viable alternative to court litigation for the resolution of 946 
planning disputes. The experiences of Scotland throw light on the potential role for 947 
mediation at the pre-planning stages and the need for further research here.  948 
 949 
New South Wales 950 
 951 
ADR has enjoyed a lengthy but turbulent history within 1HZ6RXWK:DOHV¶ planning 952 
system. A GHGLFDWHG/DQGDQG(QYLURQPHQW&RXUW>µ/(&¶@ZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQWR953 
try and move away from the adversarial style of dispute resolution which characterises 954 
the judicial process in the vast majority of common law jurisdictions. The emphasis of 955 
the LEC was on speed and informality. Disputes were presided over by Judges and/or 956 
non-lawyers µ$VVHVVRUV¶²experts in the field of planning, for example surveyors, 957 
town planners, architects and engineers (Ratcliffe et al, 2009)²depending upon 958 
whether the dispute involved complex points of law or technical planning issues. In 959 
tandem with this judicial process, the 1979 Act emphasised the importance of ADR 960 
and introduced a Conciliation Conference mechanism to allow parties to meet with an 961 
Assessor to resolve their planning disputes in a non-adjudicative manner; however, 962 
this mechanism was so unsuccessful in resolving disputes that it was ultimately 963 
disbanded in the 1990s and replaced with court-annexed mediation (Ryan, 2002). This 964 
was also largely unsuccessful; in its early years only 4% of all planning disputes were 965 
referred to this mediation mechanism, and only 60% of those disputes were resolved 966 
successful (Dearing, 2011). One of the reasons for the low number of referrals to this 967 
mediation process was that it remained voluntary and local authorities demonstrated 968 
a preference for their disputes to be resolved by the Land and Environment Court, as 969 
it was felt that this two-tier Court was better equipped to deal with complex legal issues 970 
than Assessor- or, as they latterly became known, Commissioner-facilitated mediation 971 
(Wulf, 2007). 972 
 973 
In 2010, the Land and Court Act 1979 (NSW) was reformed and a mandatory 974 
conciliation-arbitration system was introduced for the resolution of certain classes of 975 
residential planning appeals. This process has been largely successful²resulting in a 976 
substantial increase in the number of planning appeals being resolved without 977 
recourse to formal litigation²and has even been used in a limited number of cases as 978 
an alternative to judicial review proceedings. This supports the argument made in 979 
sections 2 and 3 of this paper, that if an alternative dispute resolution mechanism is 980 
going to be introduced as an alternative to court litigation, then a hybrid between 981 
mediation and arbitration is preferable to traditional mediation.  982 
 983 
 984 
 985 
 986 
 987 
 988 
Scotland 989 
 990 
A Scotland-wide review of the strategic planning framework undertaken in 2002, along 991 
with a public consultation on public involvement in planning, revealed high levels of 992 
dissatisfaction and alienation between the electorate and the Scottish planning 993 
authorities (Hague and Jenkins, 2005).  994 
 995 
One of the reform proposals to emerge from this process was the introduction of a 996 
third party right of appeal of first-instance planning decisions (Scottish Government, 997 
2004). Developers responded that the introduction of such a right, which is already 998 
enjoyed in various forms in various jurisdictions including Sweden, Ireland and New 999 
South Wales, would increase substantially the number of appeal applications and 1000 
hamper the efficiency of the planning process (Sidaway, 2013). On the other hand, 1001 
some authors and commentators have argued that the introduction of such a right 1002 
would force developers to invite stakeholders to participate in the planning process at 1003 
an earlier stage, which would improve public confidence in the planning system and 1004 
mitigate the potential surge in third party planning appeals (Sidaway, 2013). Arguably, 1005 
it is here, at the pre-planning stages, that mediation might have a valuable role to play. 1006 
It will be recalled from the analysis undertaken in section 2 of this paper that there 1007 
does exist empirical evidence in support of this idea; while this kind of mediated pre-1008 
planning consultation process may be costly and time-consuming, if there existed a 1009 
third party right of appeal, then developers would be incentivised to fund this exercise, 1010 
to reduce the likelihood of a third party appeal being lodged (Jackson, 2010). Perhaps 1011 
the most convincing argument for moving the public consultation process to the pre-1012 
planning stage is that it gives developers and architects the opportunity to devise a 1013 
scheme which has the highest prospects of success; if the developer waits until the 1014 
appeal stage of the process to contest stakeholder objections then the scope for 1015 
amending the proposals and the costs of doing so will be greatly increased. This is a 1016 
view confirmed by Pauline Roberts of Nathaniel Litchfield and Partners, although she 1017 
confirms that her clients usually invite interested third-parties to participate in the pre-1018 
planning process in any event, to de-risk the prospects of an application being refused 1019 
on the basis of third party objections. 1020 
  1021 
While, ultimately, this reform was not implemented in the Scottish Planning Act 1022 
(MaCafferty et al, 2009), nevertheless this author believes that there is scope for 1023 
further research here. While an evaluation of the role of mediation at the pre-planning 1024 
stage falls outside the scope of this present paper²as this paper is concerned with 1025 
mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism and not as a dispute prevention 1026 
strategy²nevertheless, based upon the otherwise gloomy picture painted by this 1027 
research for the role of traditional mediation in planning, of all the reform proposals 1028 
discussed within this paper, the introduction of pre-planning mediation (either as a 1029 
requirement or as an indirect effect of introducing enhanced third party rights at a later 1030 
stage in the planning process) seems to hold the most promise, if not in terms of cost-1031 
effectiveness, certainly in terms of enhanced public participation.  1032 
 1033 
  1034 
Final conclusions and recommendations for further research in this field.  1035 
 1036 
The primary objective of this present study was to evaluate the viability of mediation 1037 
as a mechanism for the resolution of planning disputes which occur between 1038 
developers and public authorities, bearing in mind the overwhelming support amongst 1039 
practitioners and commentators for the adoption of a more formalised mediation 1040 
regime in the UK planning system. 1041 
 1042 
Surprisingly, the findings of this research indicate that, presently, there is no strong 1043 
case for the introduction of such a regime, at least not as an alternative to court 1044 
OLWLJDWLRQ)LUVWO\WKHWHUPµPHGLDWLRQ¶LVVRSRRUO\GHILQHGE\LWVSURSRQHQWVWKDWLWLV1045 
not entirely clear what kind of dispute resolution mechanism any of these authors are, 1046 
in fact, proposing. Second, there does not exist an adequate evidence-base from 1047 
which to justify the implementation of a formaliseGPHGLDWLRQUHJLPHZLWKLQWKH8.¶V1048 
planning system, on grounds of cost-effectiveness. Thirdly, while a substantial number 1049 
of planning disputes are likely of a kind which lend themselves naturally to resolution 1050 
by mediation, it is not at all clear how the present rights of third parties which are 1051 
enshrined within the existing English planning system²namely, to be represented in 1052 
the planning appeals process²would  be replicated or enhanced by the use of 1053 
mediation. Fourthly, the adoption of a formal mediation regime of the kind proposed 1054 
could exacerbate the regional disparity in public decision-making which the UK 1055 
government seems so keen to address and could stifle the development of English 1056 
planning law, by restricting the flow of judicial precedent. Fifthly, it is not at all clear 1057 
that mediation would be a viable alternative to judicial enforcement, as the adoption of 1058 
a formaliseG PHGLDWLRQ UHJLPH IRU WKHVH NLQGV RI µGLVSXWH¶ FRXOG XQGHUPLQH WKH1059 
deterrent effect of the conditions annexed to planning permission grants. Sixthly, there 1060 
does not seem to be a strong case for introducing a mediation process to sit between 1061 
failed section 106 negotiations and the judicial appeals process; if a section 106 1062 
negotiation fails then a mediation would likely fail for the same reasons.  1063 
 1064 
Further research is required to test the viability of (i) introducing a mediation-arbitration 1065 
or conciliation-arbitration procedure as an alternative to court litigation for the 1066 
resolution of planning disputes; and, (ii) introducing a pre-planning mediation 1067 
procedure to improve the efficiency of the planning process and improve stakeholder 1068 
participation.  1069 
 1070 
 1071 
 1072 
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